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Abstract
This article examines whether or not the incomes of the poor systematically
grow with average incomes, and whether nancial development enhances the
incomes of the poorest quintile. Following the methodology of Dollar & Kraay
(2002), I nd once extending Dollar & Kraay's data their ndings are robust
and economic growth is important to poverty reduction universally. However
in comparison to other authors work I nd nancial development aids the
incomes of the poor in certain regions, whilst it may be detrimental in others
adding a further contribution to the literature on nancial development and
poverty.
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1. Introduction
Since the turn of the millennium, and up until the nancial crisis growth of
the world economy has been relatively strong. Growth with equity is a chal-
lenge that most governments have tried to establish with sceptics suggesting
both cannot be accomplished simultaneously. Dollar & Kraay (2002) in an
inuential paper asked does the per capita income growth of the poor rise
proportionally, less than proportionally, or more than proportionally to av-
erage per capita income growth? Their ndings suggest that this is the case
hence emphasize the importance of economic growth for poverty reduction.
If growth is good for the poor, then policies that are growth enhancing should
be encouraged. Existing literature suggests that there exist certain policies
Preprint submitted to Elsevier September 20, 2011and institutions that may further stimulate economic growth. In their pa-
per Dollar & Kraay suggest that trade openness, government consumption,
the ination rate, the rule of law and nancial development may inuence
economic growth. Furthermore a claim laid down is that these policies may
even accrue or oset the income growth of the poor.
This is not to suggest that further factors may inuence the economic growth
process. Education is one tool that has been attributed to growth amongst
others.
A rough battery of empirical evidence supports Dollar & Kraay's suggestions
where openness to trade has been found to increase long run GDP per capita
growth. Using the Sachs Warner index as a measure of openness, Greenaway
Morgan & Wright (1998) nd when this indicator variable takes the value of
one highlighting an open economy, growth may be increased by 46%. East-
erly & Rebelo (1993) found government consumption was harmful to growth
however Dorwick (1996) found that government consumption may be growth
enhancing if it was maintained between a region of 10{18%. There is sub-
stantial evidence that ination is harmful to growth. Barro (1996) states that
an increase in ination of ten percentage points retards growth by 0.2-0.3%
hence over a thirty year period growth may be reduced up to 7%. Examining
past work on the role of strong property rights and/or rule of law Knack &
Keefer (1995) mention their importance for growth while Barro (1996) em-
pirically tests this hypothesis nding for favourable growth rates a strong
legal system is required.
The literature on nancial development and economic growth is extremely
rich where early theoretical suggestions such as those by Schumpeter (1911)
state that nance was important to economic growth. Critics have chal-
lenged this view suggesting nance merely follows growth, Robinson (1962).
King & Levine (1993) in their interestingly title paper - \Schumpeter might
be right" tested these theories empirically and found that nance may cause
economic growth. Moreover the papers results have since been complemented
by further studies, including time series approaches and those of panel data
from authors such as Arestis & Demetriades (1997), Luintel & Kahn (1999),
Levine, Loayza & Beck (2000) and Levine (2003).
Recently Rousseau & Watchel (2005) discuss whether or not the nance-
growth nexus has become extinct. The authors took the King & Levine
(1993) data, and thoroughly examined the robustness of the relationship to
2nd that the results failed to carry over when more data was added to the
research question. On a closer inspection they found that when splitting the
sample into 5 year periods that the 1970s and early 1980s were the main
drivers of the relationship hence from 1990 onwards the data was susceptible
to the Lucas critique.
If nancial development is no longer growth enhancing as the results from
Rousseau & Watchel seem to suggest, a question exists { is there any benet
from nancial development to the poor?
Theoretically if nance is available to the poor then it may provide the poor
with a means to save. In less developed countries (LDCs) cases exist where
money is stored under a mattress which may be problematic and hamper a
households ability to move up the social ladder. First this money is vulner-
able to theft, and keeping track of where all the money is hidden within a
household is challenging. Second if saving accounts exist for the poor and are
indexed to ination, then periods of macroeconomic instability which usually
are characterised with periods of hyperination, a bank account can prevent
this money from eroding away in value. With a lack of savings accounts cases
exist where the poor waste accumulated assets on the purchase of unneces-
sary physical capital, for example oxen for farming. These physical assets
do not improve productivity or oer any major returns to the poor; they are
just purchased for their ease of monitoring/storage and are highly illiquid
when acquired. Moreover the lack of savings accounts prevents the ability
to utilise savings and create a more systematic consumption pattern. The
presence of savings accounts could prevent transitory poverty by allowing the
possibility of consumption smoothing.
Furthermore savings accounts in nancial institutions may help the poor as
accumulated savings over a generation may allow a family's ospring to pay
for, and attain higher levels of formal education if parents are altruistic. This
allows inter-generational mobility through the classes to be established more
easily.
If we assume a xed cost to be an entrepreneur, with perfect nancial mar-
kets a poor budding entrepreneur could go to a bank, highlight his business
plan and the ability of nancial institutions to monitor and recognise good in-
vestments allows poor entrepreneurs (those with the greatest entrepreneurial
ability and the most talent) to have societies funds directed to them, as
opposed to those with average ideas and existing wealth/established connec-
tions/collateral to take out a loan. This provides the necessary opportunities
3for the poor to move up the social ladder.
Research on nance and poverty alleviation is much more recent and in its
infancy compared to studies on nance and aggregate growth. Claessens
& Perotti (2007) provide a summary of the existing literature, where Beck,
Demeriguc-Kunt & Levine (2007) provide fascinating empirical results.
Beck et al. (2007) complement the study of Dollar & Kraay (2002) with a
stricter focus on the impact of nancial development on poverty, specically
examining the Gini coecient, the income share of the poor, and the per-
centage of people living on less than $1 a day1. Their conclusions indicate
that nancial development is poverty reducing. Furthermore they nd that
40% of income growth from the poorest quintile is a result of reductions in
inequality but 60% due to the impact of nancial development on aggregate
growth. Hence not only is nancial development in their study positively
associated with income growth of the poor but their results suggest that -
nancial sector reforms which reduce market frictions would not only boost
growth, but lower inequality without the incentive problems which redistri-
bution schemes that include generous social security payments create.
Hence this paper does not just focus on nance and its eects on poverty, but
it also considers whether or not aggregate growth has an impact on the poor
in tandem. The motivation of this study is to examine rst whether unlike
the results found by Rousseau & Watchel on the nance-growth nexus, do
Dollar & Kraays (2002) ndings remain with the inclusion of more data.
Second I wish to complement the Beck et al. (2007) study by using addi-
tional measures of nancial development such as those used by King & Levine
(1993) which were found to break down by Rousseau & Watchel (2005) where
modern data was included. Moreover I choose to include a market based mea-
sure of nancial development in the hope to prove that for poverty reduction
that it is just the overall level of nancial development that matters, regard-
less if the development comes from the bank side or the market side. In
addition I choose to strictly follow the Dollar & Kraay methodology in the
hope that the relationship between nance and poverty proposed by Beck et
al. (2007) withstands when testing the relationship in an additional way.
1Recent updates state the new poverty line is $1.25 a day as suggested by Ravallion,
Chen & Sangraula (2008) \Dollar a day revisited."
4In this study, when including further data which covers over one hundred
countries and spans over a time frame of fty years I would hope that the
my results show that growth is good for the poor hence are at least as sig-
nicant as those provided by Dollar & Kraay (2002). Second I would hope
to add to the Beck et al. (2007) study with results that show that nancial
development is imperative to the income growth of the poor irrelevant of
the nancial development indicator used2. Section 2 describes the data and
method, section 3 presents the results and section 4 concludes.
2. Data & Methodology
The original data is from Dollar & Kraay (2002) available from The World
Bank3 to download. The extended dataset comes from World Bank databases
with information and denitions of the data found in table A of the appendix.
The dependent variable income growth of the poor is measured as the GDP
per capita growth of the income of the lowest quintile4. This measure is
used rst as it is consistent with the study of Dollar & Kraay of which I am
trying to extend and check who's initial results hold, but second because it
is a variable that is abundant. For further measures of the poor that are
mentioned earlier in this paper data collection has only recently occurred,
and in particular observations on poverty headcounts would be so low that
it would not be worth pursuing in this particular study.
Financial development in this instance is measured as the depth of the nan-
cial system. Ideally further measures that show the outreach of the nancial
system (breadth) would be useful, for example data showing the amount of
access the nance system provides, but sadly due to data scarcity this can-
not be accomplished. Private credit as a ratio of GDP is one of the most
frequently used measures of nancial development and measures the chan-
nelling of savers funds to private projects, one main function of nancial
intermediaries. This variable was used by Beck et al. (2007) in their own
particular extension of Dollar & Kraay.
2Financial development is dened in the next section, as are the ways it is measured.
3www.worldbank.org/research/growth
4For the new waves of data I use the UN-WIDER Inequality Database
http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database to calculate the new income shares.
5Further measures of nancial development are also well used in the litera-
ture. King & Levine (1993) use liquid liabilities as a ratio of GDP5. This
variable was found to be signicant in the study of King & Levine (1993)
on aggregate growth but became insignicant in the Rousseau & Watchel
(2005) paper when they extended the former authors data. Hence I choose
to include this measure of nancial development due to the interesting expe-
riences this variable has shown in the literature.
As mentioned prior I choose to incorporate a market measure of nancial
development. The chosen variable is stock market capitalisation. Empirical
results suggest that stock markets may increase growth, Levine & Zervos
(1998), with further conclusions from the authors highlighting banks provide
dierent services than those provided by stock markets stressing their impor-
tance. Moreover research suggests that countries with better developed stock
markets also have better developed banks. In entrepreneurial projects where
disagreement exists about investing in a venture, a well nanced minority
of investors may still be able to nance the project through the purchase of
shares, where a bank may be reluctant to invest without a clear majority in
agreement of funding the enterprise. This may be important for poor en-
trepreneurs who may only be able to convince a minority of investors about
their venture. Other research states that the overall development of the -
nancial sector is important regardless if the development is from banks or
markets furthermore highlighting the inclusion of this variable.
Ideally a measure for the stock market such as the turnover ratio, or even
value traded would have been appropriate to use in the study as this shows
the liquidity of the stock market. One important factor of trading in the
stock market is that for a saver, his stocks may be transferred into cash
quickly, however as data is limited6 the measure stock market capitalisation
as a ratio of GDP was used.
The control variables selected in the study are those that were used by Dollar
& Kraay (2002) and are selected here to make sure that when their results
are checked for the Lucas critique everything remains consistent. Beck et
5Liquid liabilities is measured as M3 as a ratio of GDP and is also known as broad
money. It measures the overall size of the banking system. Hence it shows the extent of
the formal nancial intermediary sector relative to economic activity.
6For the Dollar & Kraay sample using Stock Market Capitalisation led to a sample of
only 53 observations, with Value traded this gure was far smaller.
6al. (2007) favoured a dierent approach where they replaced the rule of law
variable with the average years of school attainment to control for schooling
and as opposed to controlling for GDP per capita growth at the mean level
as Dollar & Kraay (2002) and I do, they control for GDP per capita growth
using growth of the lowest income share7.
I measure the income of the poor as the income share of lowest quintile8. To
update the sample if the data from the same named source exists and was
updated for country (i) I use that source irrelevant of quality ratings. If the
data from the same named source doesn't exist for future waves I select the
observation based on two certain criteria, rst I try and choose the observa-
tions with the highest quality ratings while simultaneously trying to select
the data sources that are most frequently used in the already existing dataset
from Dollar & Kraay (2002).
The new data for the remaining variables was selected following the Dollar
& Kraay (2002) procedure where I select the last observation for a particular
cross section (i) used by Dollar & Kraay and then move forward a minimum
of 5 years, selecting data for the next decade until time expires for that par-
ticular cross section. In some cases a particular cross section permitted the
inclusion of more than one additional time period (t) as revisions in data
meant that some data in the penultimate decade were now available. Hence
at times two or three waves were added to certain cross sections but this was
a rarity9.
Table 1 shows how the number of observations and cross sections increase
when I add further data when examining the nancial variables10. The far
larger number of observations and cross sections in my study provides greater
worldwide representation in my estimations and increased exibility for the
7When the correlations were examined prior to running the regressions it was found
that including both rule of law and schooling would cause multicollinearity problems and
as I was following Dollar & Kraay (2002) more specically to Beck et al. (2007) I chose
the former.
8For the new waves of data I use the UN-WIDER Inequality Database
http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database to calculate the new income shares.
9The reasoning for using this methodology is to prevent the sample to be over-
dominated by those countries whose income distribution data is more frequent and abun-
dant.
10Full descriptive statistics of the variables may be found in the appendix, Table B.
7number of instruments used when using the system estimator to be discussed
shortly.
An important observation is that when Beck et al. (2007) run their system
estimator using private credit they have 245 observations whilst I have close
to 300 when a full set of controls are imposed hence fortunately I have a
richer dataset. Second the data also spans into a time when the world econ-
omy suered a shock with the global nancial crisis. Despite not being my
primary research question, it may be interesting to see whether or not the
crisis did have any eects on the income growth of the poor in comparison
to Beck et al. (2007).
Table 1: Comparisons Between The Two Samples
Dollar & Kraay (2002) Updated Sample
Obs. Cross Sections Obs. Cross Sections
Basic Specication 269 85 414 115
Commercial Bank 232 76 367 108
Private Credit 221 74 362 109
Liquid Liabilities 204 65 332 103
Stock Market 53 30 143 69
Initially I carry out cross country regressions where I regress the per capita
income of the poor on the natural logarithm of average per capita income.
Unlike other methods which use one observation per cross section11 I use all
available data in order to preserve degrees of freedom hence run pooled cross
country regressions.
Equation (1) is initially estimated using ordinary least squares and then
using instrumental variables. Instrumenting for mean income is carried out
by using growth in mean income prior to time (t).
Y
p





i;t k = (Yi;t   Yi;t k) + (i;t   i;t k) (2)
11See Beck et al. (2007) for detailed information on this technique.
8In reality it would be quite common to nd unobserved country specic ef-
fects (i) to exist such as those in equation (1) hence I regress equation
(1) in dierences, equation (2). I would expect individual country eects to
perhaps have some eects on the results, where certain countries located in
advantaged regions and abundant with resources may have a positive eect
on the income growth of the poor, but to what extent I cannot be sure. Nev-
ertheless dierencing sweeps away these individual eects12. I then estimate
equation (2) using ordinary least squares and then an instrumental variable
approach. When applying the instrumental variable estimator to equation
(2) a further instrument is used, the level of mean income at the beginning
of the period.
Despite removing the unobserved country specic eects by estimating our
equation in dierences (2), it would be more ideal to exploit the wider cross
country variation as opposed to the time series variation as equation (2)
does. As a result I use a panel estimator and the favoured estimator in this
instance is system GMM proposed by Arellano & Bond (1991). If we assume
that the coecients of (1) and (2) are the same we may regress our relation
as a system. The proposed estimator not only manages to fully control for
country-specic eects but also may deal with endogeneity concerns.
Y
p
i;t =  + Yi;t + 
0





i;t k = (Yi;t   Yi;t k) + 
0
(Xi;t   Xi;t k) + (i;t   i;t k) (4)
Equations (3) and (4) introduce additional variables into the specication
in the (X) matrix. Some of the control variables mentioned may too be en-
dogenous. Dollar & Kraay claim endogeneity concerns may exist for nancial
development13 and ination, but not openness to trade14. As I strictly follow
12Note that here the  and the i term get dierenced away.
13Beck, Demeriguc-Kunt & Levine (2007) treat nancial development as endogenous
and instrument it using absolute latitude of a nation's capital indexed between 0 and 1,
and by legal origin.
14Dollar & Kraay (2002) fail to mention about the rule of law but one would expect
that this variable may be endogenous.
9Dollar & Kraay (2002) I instrument for income only, as my results { as those
found in Dollar & Kraay (2002) show the tests of overidentifying restrictions
pass even when instrumenting for income only. This provides indirect evi-
dence that the X variables are uncorrelated with the error terms. Second if
I was to instrument for all possible endogenous variables using appropriate
lags, then the sample would be greatly reduced15.
The GMM estimator controls for endogeneity using internal instruments
where it uses specied lagged variables in level terms as instruments for
each variable, and in the level equation chosen lags are used as instruments.
The chosen estimator requires that there exist more instruments than endoge-
nous regressors16 hence the equation is over identied, and two specication
tests exist to check the validity of the instruments, the Hansen J-Test or the
Sargan Test. A second assumption is required when using this estimator that
no second order serial correlation exists, however the estimation procedure
requires the presence of rst order serial correlation. If these two main as-
sumptions are not violated, hence both null hypotheses are not rejected from
the specication tests, then the coecient estimates are ecient.
In all the regressions I also run a hypothesis tests to see if growth is really
good for the poor. This follows suit to Dollar & Kraay, where I test whether
the coecient on average per capita income is 1. If the coecient on ()
is not signicantly dierent from 1 then the incomes of the poorest quintile
grow systematically with average incomes - a result that I wish to hold for
all the estimations.
3. Results
Table 2 shows the replicated results of Dollar & Kraay using Stata where
table 3 shows my results when the data is updated. In all specications it is
seen that average growth is positive and signicant with a coecient close to
15When instrumenting for these variables in the nal regressions the instrument count
becomes almost double to the number of cross sections and GMM becomes inconsistent
as the number of instruments becomes too large
16It is also stated that the number of instruments used should be far less than the
number of cross sectional units.
101. When the hypothesis test is run, table 2 suggests that the null hypothesis
that income growth of the poor is proportional to mean income growth is
only rejected in column one. However this rejection seems to be a positive
rejection where a 1% increase in mean income growth would increase growth
of the poorest quintile by more than 1%.
Table 2: Simple Growth Regressions
Income Income Dierenced Dierenced System
Quintile 1 Quintile 1 Income Income
Quintile 1 Quintile 1
OLS IV OLS IV GMM
Intercept -1.762*** -2.720** -1.259***
(0.211) (1.257) (0.501)
GDP 1.072*** 1.187*** 0.983*** 0.904*** 1.012***
(0.024) (0.151) (0.079) (0.119) (0.060)
P-Ho  = 1 0.003 0.215 0.834 0.421 0.836
P-OID 0.177 0.235
T-NOSC -0.800
Obs. 269 269 269 269 269
Dependent Variable = ln Per Capita Income Growth of the Poor.
Standard Errors in parenthesis.
(*) (**) (***) Indicates (10%) (5%) (1%) signicance.
When the data is extended the results appear to be stronger. For the bench-
mark case, it may be stated that growth is good for the poor, and that the
original results from Dollar & Kraay (2002) are robust to the Lucas critique.
With the additional data the specication test that ( = 1) is rejected on
three occasions, in columns one, two and ve of table 3. Moreover in all
three instances the nature of the rejection posits that income growth of the
11lowest quintile grows more than proportionally to average per capita income
growth.
Table 3: Simple Growth Regressions - Updated Sample
Income Income Dierenced Dierenced System
Quintile 1 Quintile 1 Income Income
Quintile 1 Quintile 1
OLS IV OLS IV GMM
Intercept -1.567*** -4.029*** -1.494***
(0.124) (1.322) (0.182)
GDP 1.044*** 1.345*** 0.980*** 1.065*** 1.040***
(0.145) (0.161) (0.049) (0.100) (0.023)
P-Ho  = 1 0.003 0.033 0.690 0.517 0.080
P-OID 0.141 0.579
T-NOSC 0.630
Obs. 414 414 414 414 414
Notes: As table 2.
One variant of the specication was to test whether the slope of average
growth on the system estimator varies by region. The Dollar & Kraay results
show for most regions the overall eect of the coecients is approximately
one, however the coecient for the omitted category, the rich countries shows
an elasticity of 1.35%.
The elasticity of the poors incomes with respect to average incomes in Latin
America is 0.34 which is very low and Dollar & Kraay (2002) state this result
is attributed to the unusually poor performance of instruments in the sample.
When the sample is extended the results dier by a large degree. Here the
addition of a decades worth of data, the growth coecient for the control

























Dependent Variable = ln Per Capita Income Growth of the Poor.
Standard Errors in parenthesis
(*) (**) (***) Indicates (10%) (5%) (1%) signicance
Notes: Regional Dummies are included in the regression.
13group17 shrinks to over half its size, and the slope coecients for the regions
switch signs. Moreover the overall eects exhibit interesting results as in the
new sample all the coecients with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa are
very close to unity, and are all signicant. If we compare that to the control
group it is shown that if growth rates for all countries were equal, a catching
up eect in terms of income growth would take place for the poor in those
regions relative to the control groups poor.
It may be plausible to suggest that the results seen in table 4 have occurred
due to the intensity of mean economic growth as a determinant on the in-
come growth of the lowest quintile. Over the period from 2000-09 when the
sample has been updated, with the exception of the nancial crisis, most
regions have had growth rates that have outperformed those of the control
group. It may be for that very reason why the results exhibit a catching up
eect for the income growth of the poor relative to the control group.
This highlights an important consideration as it may be the case that when
examining nancial development the eects may dier between the control
group, sub-Saharan Africa, and all remaining regions just as they do with
the growth regressions in table 4.
Beck, Demeriguc-Kunt & Levine (2007) tested the relationship between -
nancial development and the level of economic development nding that this
interaction was insignicant hence income growth of the poor did not vary
with the level of GDP per capita. I on the other hand posit that regions may
act dierently to nancial development and apply the idea that locality and
space may be more inuential than varying levels of GDP per capita alone.
The inclusion of control variables to vary the specication yield results sim-
ilar to Dollar & Kraay (2002). Included are trade openness, government
consumption, the presence of ination, and the rule of law quality. These
variables are included one at a time following the authors methodology, and
the results in table 5 show all the coecients are correctly signed and statis-
tically signicant, with similar magnitudes as in the Dollar & Kraay paper.
In all regressions average GDP per capita remains positive signicant and
yields a coecient close to one indicating that the relationship between mean
income growth and that of the income growth of the poor is robust. Moreover
both the tests for overidentifying restrictions and no presence of second serial
17The control group is Western Europe, USA and Canada.
14correlation are passed with their respective p-values in the non rejection zone
of the null hypotheses.
Investigating the eects of nance on the poor is shown in table 6. Here
columns 1-4 present the results for the original sample size and columns 5-8
for the extended period. The variable commercial bank assets as a ratio of
total bank assets is successfully replicated in column one using the Dollar &
Kraay data. This variable is positive and insignicant which is also the case
when the sample is extended. The addition of private credit in column two
yields a coecient which is also positive and insignicant, one main dier-
ence to the results found by Beck et al. (2007). In their study the authors
found private credit to be a signicant determinant to the income growth
of the poor, and the same applied for their other measures of poverty. In
the extended sample period which covers the Beck et al. (2007) time frame
the same result holds that private credit enters insignicantly. This seems
to suggest that the relationship between nancial development and poverty
alleviation is sensitive to the specication chosen to examine poverty.
When examining further measures of nancial development, liquid liabilities
enters positively and signicantly. This reects the overall size of the bank-
ing sector in relation to economic activity. Here in both sample periods the
results are signicant and the coecient is greater when the larger data set
is used however both coecients are in line with previous estimates of the
literature with coecients of approximately 2%. The variable stock market
capitalisation is negative and signicant in column 4 indicating nance is
detrimental to income growth of the poor18, but becomes insignicant when
the sample is lengthened.
18This particular results is very sceptical due to the small sample size.
15Table 5: Additional Control Variables
Openess G'ment Cons Ination Rule of Law Openess G'ment Cons Ination Rule of Law
Intercept -0.858 -1.065* -0.963 -0.642 -0.969*** -0.802*** -0.782*** -0.445
(0.705) (0.580) (0.594) (0.602) (0.344) (0.280) (0.282) (0.365)
GDP 0.993*** 1.019*** 1.002*** 0.950*** 0.998*** 0.990*** 0.979*** 0.931***
(0.078) (0.065) (0.063) (0.070) (0.037) (0.032) (0.030) (0.043)
Openess -0.039 -0.016
(0.150) (0.058)




Rule of Law 0.082 0.071
(0.062) (0.046)
P-Ho  = 1 0.850 0.772 0.975 0.481 0.961 0.745 0.481 0.111
P-OID 0.870 0.869 0.585 0.486 0.796 0.712 0.757 0.677
T-NOSC -0.55 -0.40 -0.22 -0.76 1.18 1.09 0.97 -0.02
Obs. 223 237 253 268 359 374 413 362
Notes: As table 4.
1
6Table 6: Analysing Financial Development
Commercial Private Liquid Stock Commercial Private Liquid Stock
Bank Credit Liabilities Market Bank Credit Liabilities Market
Intercept -0.964 -1.072 -0.799 -0.381 -1.112** -1.124* -0.985** -2.330**
(0.675) (1.429) (0.945) (1.519) (0.543) (0.591) (0.473) (1.092)
GDP 0.997*** 1.031*** 0.955*** 0.923*** 0.940*** 1.016*** 0.949*** 1.099***
(0.088) (0.191) (0.141) (0.301) (0.061) (0.069) (0.062) (0.084)
Commercial Bank 0.036 0.134
(0.212) (0.280)
Private Credit 0.089 0.214
(0.146) (0.184)
Liquid Liabilities 0.018* 0.023**
(0.011) (0.010)
Stock Market -0.266** -0.156
(0.103) (0.095)
P-Ho  = 1 0.970 0.871 0.752 0.797 0.322 0.821 0.414 0.235
P-OID 0.832 0.324 0.544 0.416 0.309 0.756 0.650 0.111
T-NOSC -0.55 -0.46 -0.14 0.10 0.26 0.68 0.78 1.06
Obs. 219 205 189 53 301 292 266 110
Notes: As table 4.
1
7The results presented indicate that past results from the nance and poverty
literature are susceptible to the specications and control variables used, but
also to the measure of nancial development. Here private credit, which
shows the nancial resources provided as credit to the private sector, is in-
signicant. Yet when liquid liabilities is used as a nancial development
indicator the results are signicant. It may be that what the poor really re-
quire are deposit accounts, or methods to save money which liquid liabilities
may pick up more eectively than say private credit. Hence opportunities to
save may matter more for the poor, as opposed to borrowing opportunities to
expand businesses or become entrepreneurs, which is what the results seem
to show.
Once more all the specication tests are passed and examining the coecient
on mean growth, it keeps its strong signicance and the hypothesis of ( =
1) is never rejected.
Table 7 takes the results from table 6 further interacting the nancial devel-
opment variable with worldwide regions. In Beck, Demeriguc-Kunt & Levine
(2007) it mentions how over their sample period the population living on less
than $1 a day in Thailand fell dramatically but how the rate doubled in
Venezuela, and how certain countries who happened to be in certain regions
experienced large increases in their Gini coecients whilst others noticed a
fall. Moreover I am motivated by ideas of spatial economics where contiguity
of countries that share borders may be categorised more closely than by mere
economic development. The results presented in table 7 shows that depend-
ing on which region of the world a country is situated, it has a severe impact
whether nancial development is good for the income growth of the poor.
More importantly three of the nancial development indicators all now enter
positively and signicantly19 providing evidence that a one size ts all model
may not be the case when examining nance and the poor, an additional
contribution to the existing literature.
Foremost all the banking sector measures of nancial development20 enter
positively and signicantly for the control group. The market based measure
19It must be noted that these coecients represent the values for the control group.
20Commercial bank assets, private credit and liquid liabilities are the bank based mea-
sures of nancial development used in the paper.
18Table 7: Analysing Finance and Regional Interactions
Commercial Private Liquid Stock
Bank Credit Liabilities Market
GDP 0.937*** 1.008*** 1.026*** 0.935***









Fin*EAP -0.144 -0.232* -0.219** -0.242**
(0.124) (0.134) (0.092) (0.112)
Fin*ECA 0.077 0.686*** 0.523*** -0.076
(0.120) (0.237) (0.201) (0.322)
Fin*LAC -0.754*** -1.540*** -1.426*** -0.957***
(0.112) (0.240) (0.326) (0.328)
Fin*MENA -0.142 -0.163** -0.155 0.245
(0.169) (0.083) (0.130) (0.232)
Fin*SA 0.105 0.929** 0.516* 1.248*
(0.169) (0.364) (0.279) (0.668)
Fin*SSA -0.474** -1.039*** -0.808** -0.255**
(0.200) (0.345) (0.407) (0.117)
P-Ho  = 1 0.929 0.879 0.924 0.026
P-OID 0.564 0.891 0.806 0.426
T-NOSC 0.16 0.66 0.70 0.78
Obs. 301 292 266 110
Notes: As table 4.
Intercept & control variables also included in the regression.
19stock market capitalisation is the only nancial variable that is insignicant
for the control group.
Looking at the interactions between nancial development and the regions,
the rst bank based measure commercial bank assets has signicant interac-
tions for the Latin America & Caribbean region and the Sub-Saharan African
region. When testing for the linear combinations this nancial measure then
returns a positive and signicant coecient for Eastern Europe and Central
Asia, and for South Asia.
Examining additional measures of nance, Private Credit returns a regres-
sion with all the interactions signicant. When testing for their linear com-
binations Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and South Asia suggest that a
percentage point increase in private credit in these regions, then the growth
of income of the poorest quintile will increase by 1% or more. The Latin
American region and Sub-Saharan African region suggest that nance may
be negatively associated with incomes of the poorest quintiles in these areas.
A percentage point increase in private credit in the former will lead to a
reduction in income growth of the poor by over 1% whilst in Sub-Saharan
Africa a gure of 0.69%.
Liquid Liabilities has signicant regional interactions for all areas except for
the Middle East and North African zone. When testing for the linear com-
binations, all the regions maintain their signicance with one exception, the
area of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Column 4 containing the nancial development variable stock market cap-
italisation shows that nance is insignicant in the control region, Eastern
Europe & Central Asia, and in the Middle East & North Africa. When the
linear combinations are tested a further region, East Asia & the Pacic loses
its signicance. The remaining signicant regions, Sub-Saharan Africa and
Latin America & the Caribbean suggest nance is detrimental on income
growth of the poor. The only remaining positive and signicant region is
South Asia with a percentage point increase in stock market capitalisation
resulting in an increase in income growth of the poor by 1.26%.
The results show that there is wide variation in the eects of nancial devel-
opment on the income growth of the poor between regions. The interesting
question is why this is the case? It may be seen that in general nance
has been extremely good for the income growth of the poor in South Asia
and the Control group while this is the contrary in Latin America. There
is weak evidence from the results suggesting that nance is also harmful in
20Sub-Saharan Africa, whilst benecial in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
There are several possible hypotheses that may explain why nance has been
fruitful in some regions and not others.
First, it may be that despite a deep nancial sector, access is not universal.
In India between the years 1977 and 1990 the Indian Social Banking Ex-
periment took place where rural poverty fell dramatically, Burgess & Pande
(2005). Here policy stated that a commercial bank could only open a branch
in a location with existing bank branches, only if it opened branches in four
locations with no bank branches. The benets to the poor were great hence
in terms of policy it may be that governments should focus on providing
opportunities to utilise nance as opposed to purely focusing on depth of
the nancial sector in the sense that the only people excluded are those who
choose to be voluntarily.
In the control region political pressures normally result in wide access and
allow the poor to access nance, however in regions such as South Asia where
nance has been fruitful, past government policy broadening access may be
the reason why the poor benet from nance unlike in other regions such as
Latin America & the Caribbean.
Second nancial illiteracy of the population coupled with exploitive preda-
tory behaviour of lenders may drive the results from table 7. The poor may
only require simple transaction accounts just to take part in a market econ-
omy but as a result of being nancially illiterate they may be provided with
or ask for checking accounts where severe overdraft charges may be incurred
when the timing of payments goes wrong. It may also be a case where the
naive poor are taken advantage of by predatory lenders who do not inform
the borrower of all the conditions of the loan, crippling the poor with spi-
ralling charges where the poor may have been better o not participating
in the nancial sector at all. Educational advice such as teaching sound
money management and legal systems that strictly enforce caveat emptor
may prevent these adverse eects from occurring, as would stringent regula-
tory policy designed to make sure nancial intermediaries do not abuse their
power of full knowledge of their services.
Financial liberalisation is associated with increased competition, privatisa-
tion and foreign ownership, which may expand nancial access for the poor
once it becomes unprotable to lend to existing wealthy clientele, Gormley
21(2004) and Mian (2006). In certain worldwide locations it may have taken
longer for prot to dry up when serving existing clients21 hence why a dispar-
ity exists for why nance is benecial in some regions as opposed to others.
However Ang (2010) found liberalisation in India specically led to a worsen-
ing of the income inequality problem, where the region of South Asia which
composes of India showed great gains from nancial development. Hence
there may be an argument that forced liberalisations or hasty liberalisation
may be detrimental to the income growth of the poor, many which were
common in Latin America during the sample period. The results presented
here on nancial development indicate a one-size ts all model may not be
accurate of the world. These results may be carried over for nancial liber-
alisation hence policy advice may be to plan a liberalisation to be country
specic and not base any plans on experiences of countries who have previous
liberalised their nancial systems. This hypothesis however should perhaps
be researched in its own right.
Dierences in the eciency of the nancial institutions may partially ex-
plain the results from table 7. In regions where nance has beneted the
poor it may be that loans were targeted at good enterprises that have grown,
increased formal sector jobs (which in turn can provide poor individuals doc-
umentation to open their own nancial accounts { a barrier in many LDCs),
increased wages, hence benetted the poor. This may be as opposed to in
Latin America & the Caribbean where lending has occurred to badly targeted
SMEs who have not grown as expected hence limiting the opportunities of
the poor and not providing any income growth prospects for the lowest quin-
tile. This leads us to nancial policy advice suggesting that banks should
perhaps implement greater screening of clients business proposals prior to
lending22.
Finally it may be attributed to certain country specic eects of big-players
in the regions which may inuence the results. If theories of spatial economics
are correct it may be the case that neighbouring nations may adopt similar
practices to the big-players and as a result individual specic eects from a
21This may be attributable to the Bel-India problem.
22This debate has also been opened in light of the nancial crisis where loan ocers of
the big-banks were predicted to not have screened their clients adequately.
22country may have transmitted into the regions. This certainly may explain
why Latin America may have a negative coecient attributed to it, whilst
South Asia has a positive coecient. In Latin America, Brazil is the largest
national economy, and where nancial development has increased over time,
poverty and inequality have remained relatively high despite their notable
decreases. Whilst in India the so called big-player in South Asia, has expe-
rienced a huge decline in inequality and poverty with a fairly stable growth
in nancial development. These questions I remain unexamined for future
research.
4. Conclusion
Adding new waves of data to the existing research undertaken by Dollar &
Kraay I complement their ndings that average incomes of the poorest quin-
tile in a country rise and fall proportionally with average incomes. The addi-
tion of pro-growth policies in my estimations are also robust to the scrutiny
of new additional data. It can be said that governments that seek low levels
of ination, pursue open trade regimes, strengthen their legal systems and
curb their government spending will create good platforms for average income
growth. As income growth for the poorest fth in society grows proportion-
ally with average income growth, the results suggest to alleviate poverty by
raising the per capita incomes of the poorest quintile; basic growth-enhancing
policies still have a role to play.
Specically focusing on nance and using further measures of nancial de-
velopment I nd that nancial development may tackle poverty reduction
but not universally. It is imperative to realise a one size ts all model does
not work as dierent regions react dierently to nancial development when
we consider income growth of the poorest quintile. The extreme variation
can be specically seen comparing South Asia where nancial development
is successful in raising the income of the poorest quintile while in the region
of Latin America & the Caribbean evidence suggests the contrary.
Governments may be required to intervene to promote nancial provision
for the poor, for at least the short term. Examples of schemes to increase
outreach in the short run may be to use the already existent postal network
to provide nance by extending the post oce's services. Here high xed and
23sunk costs have already been spent so nancial transactions may be provided
at marginal cost. This should overcome the diculties of providing for low
income clients who only require small transactions until the private sector is
ready to cater for them once either technological innovation has advanced to
make it protable to do so, or when already existent revenue streams have
dried up serving high net worth customers.
Overall I highlight that the poor prot as much as everyone else to overall
per capita growth universally but with respect to nancial development this
is not the case and certain regions respond better than others.
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Measured as the share of
income of the lowest quin-
tile. Calculated by taking
the share of income of the
poorest fth and then mul-
tiplying by GDP, and then
taking the logarithm of this
value.
Dollar & Kraay (2002)
which consists of a combi-
nation of sources, Deininger
& Squire (1996), UN-
WIDER (2000), Ravaillion
and Chen (2000) and Lund-
berg and Squire (2000).
Additional waves are from
UN-WIDER (2010).
GDP This is the natural log-
arithm of real GDP per
capita. It also appears in
the body of the text as \av-
erage per capita income."
Dollar & Kraay (2002) sam-
ple and the World Bank,
World Development Indica-
tors 2010.
Openness Exports and Imports added
together as a ratio of GDP.
Dollar & Kraay (2002) and






as a ratio of GDP.
Dollar & Kraay (2002) and
The World Bank, World De-
velopment Indicators 2010.
Ination Calculated as one plus the
ination rate, and then the
natural logarithm of this
number is taken.
Dollar & Kraay (2002) and
The World Bank, World De-
velopment Indicators 2010.
25Rule of Law An index composed to as-
sign values for the quality
of rule of law. Higher num-
bers indicate a stronger rule
of law.
Dollar & Kraay (2002) and





Bank Assets as a ratio of
Total Bank Assets.
Dollar & Kraay (2002) and
the World Bank, World De-
velopment Indicators 2010





Credit as a ratio of GDP,
and measures the depth
of the nancial system,
for example the nancial
resources provided to the
private sector.
The World Bank, World De-
velopment Indicators 2010




This is calculated as a ratio
of GDP and measures the
size of the nancial interme-
diaries.
The World Bank, World De-
velopment Indicators 2010
and the Financial Structure
Database 2010.
Stock Market Calculated as the Stock
Market Capitalisation as a
ratio of GDP.
The World Bank, World De-
velopment Indicators 2010
and the Financial Structure
Database 2010.
26Table B: Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables
Variable Name Obs Mean Standard Minimum Maximum
Deviation
Income of the poor 568 6.830 1.283 3.369 10.066
GDP 568 8.033 1.164 4.740 10.760
Trade Openess 495 0.474 0.413 0.017 3.075
Government Share 522 0.143 0.054 0.011 0.400
Ination 544 0.165 0.324 -0.073 2.636
Rule of Law 508 0.242 0.937 -1.844 2.000
Commercial Bank 495 0.795 0.188 0.126 1.000
Private Credit 495 0.363 0.299 0.014 1.803
Liquid Liabilities 458 0.782 5.759 0.015 121.677*
Stock Market 233 0.345 0.447 0.000 2.659
*Denotes the outlier Venezuela 1962.
Omitting this outlier doesn't change the results signicantly.
Note the descriptive statistics are for the updated sample only.
Descriptive Statistics for the orignal dataset are available upon request.
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